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Public  Hearings  as  Proceduralization  of  Popular  Sovereignty  Policies  in 
Supreme Courts  
An Intersubjective Approach
3 
 
Abstract: This paper aims to discuss in which sense public hearings in supreme courts of democratic 
rules of law can be seen as proceduralization of popular sovereignty policies. These policies constitute 
expressions of a normative claim for a wider “publicization of law” by democratic states’ institutional 
powers  and  organs;  a  claim  that  becomes  evident  when  one  undertakes  an  intersubjective 
interpretation of law. This theoretical argument will be presented in the first section of the paper 
through a new articulation of Jürgen Habermas’ discursive theory of law and his most recent studies 
on the concept of political public sphere. The theoretical section gives normative and procedural 
criteria for the second section of the paper, which consists on a critical analysis of the procedures and 
practical cases of public hearings held at the Brazilian Supreme Court, constituting the first scientific 
study to date on the Court’s use of this legal instrument. 
Keywords: Discourse theory of law, political public sphere, publicity of law, public hearings, supreme 
courts 
 
Introduction 
This paper aims to discuss in which sense public hearings in supreme courts of democratic 
rules of law can be seen as proceduralization of popular sovereignty policies. These policies 
constitute expressions of a normative claim for institutionalizing the formation of political 
opinion and will of the citizens, a claim that becomes more evident when one undertakes an 
intersubjective interpretation of law - in this case, especially on what concerns human rights. 
This interpretation, derived from an attempt of further developing Habermas’ thesis of 
the co-originality between individual and political autonomies in Between Facts and Norms 
(Habermas, 1996), suggests that human rights are not sufficiently apprehended or justified if 
they are not considered within related practical debates and claims present in the political 
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public sphere, namely, in the social spaces formed by the interplay of political opinions on 
human  rights  that  are  constitutionally  expected  to  be  channeled  by  decision  making 
procedures of the state (Habermas, 2003:caps. IV and VI).    
The more concrete idea is to analyze, with aid on practical examples of public hearings 
held at the Brazilian Supreme Court
4, the ability of this legal instrument to compensate the so 
claimed “legitimacy deficits” of these courts’ decisions
5, as well as to generate a wide-range 
publicization  over  human  rights  issues,  whose  debates  can  in  turn  strengthen  public 
participation in the political public sphere.  
The  argument  starts  with  brief  and  specific  thematizations  of  some  of  Habermas’ 
approaches  to  epistemology,  rationality  and  law,  which  will  give  way  to  an  attempt  of 
interpreting  human  rights  intersubjectively.  Concerning  this  paper,  the  result  of  this 
interpretation is the specific claim that the adjudicatory discourses of law should consider and 
channel the communication present in the political public sphere in order to better legitimate 
their  decisions.  In  this  way,  the  new  experiences  of  public  hearings  in  constitutional 
democratic states’ supreme courts will be able to be seen as concrete expressions of these 
claims, in the form of proceduralization of popular sovereignty policies. 
The  second  part  of  the  paper  will  be  destined  to  analyze  through  this  theoretical 
framework cases and procedures of public hearings held in the Brazilian Supreme Court. The 
idea is to try to evaluate if their concrete expressions satisfy or not (and in which sense) the 
normative  criteria  that  are  presupposed  in  these  proceduralization  of  popular  sovereignty 
claims. 
 
I.  Intersubjective  interpretation  of  human  rights  and  proceduralization  of  popular 
sovereignty policies  
In  order  to  suggest  an  intersubjective  interpretation  of  human  rights  through  Habermas’ 
thought, it is first necessary to discuss some concepts of his discourse ethics and the theory of 
law that derives from it. 
                                                           
4 Despite the scientific problems of comparing empirical findings with theoretical concepts, the methodological 
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Habermas’  Ethics  of  Discourse  completes  his  epistemology  of  the  “communicative-
critical paradigm”
6, deepening the reflection towards practical reason in search of revitalizing 
its normativity through the philosophy of language. The contours of a discourse theory are 
already  present,  however,  in  the  preliminary  studies  of  the  Theorie  des  kommunikativen 
Handelns, when the idea of discourse appears as a moment in which the validity claims of the 
‘pure communicative action’ start to be problematized, leaving the “unnoticed” character of 
the  communicative  actions  which  occur  in  the  lifeworld
7,  in  order  to  demand  of  its 
interlocutors the “redemption” of its validity claims, or the posing of reasons that can validate 
them.
8  
Habermas’ ethics of discourse (Diskurs Ethik) aims to show, under his theory of formal 
pragmatics and linguistic epistemology
9, that the universalization of moral judgments, that is, 
claims  concerning  what  is  equally  best  for  all,  is  possible,  distinguishing  it  from  ethical 
judgments, which would deal with more concrete questions of “good life”, such as existential 
and identity problems. 
In this sense, the universalization principle aims precisely to distinguish “the domain of 
the  morally  valid  in  face  of  the  domain  of  the  cultural  value  contents”.  However,  the 
entanglement between these two categories of practical judgments must be made clear, for 
according  to  Habermas,  despite  their  strong  ethical  substance,  some  cultural  values 
institutionalized  as  human  rights  “candidate”  themselves  to  incorporate  an  ever  more 
universalizing  interest.  And  on  the  other  hand,  this  tendency  of  proceduralizing  practical 
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they would be present in the interactions of the subjects that argue and demand from one another reasons that 
they can accept as valid in order to coordinate in common their social action plans. For more on the influence of 
Wittgenstein, Peirce and Austin on the formulation of Habermas’ formal pragmatics, see. Habermas, “Universal 
Pragmatics: Reflections on a Theory of Communicative Competence”. In. Id., Pragmatics of Social Interaction, 
2001:67-84. On what concerns the linguistic turn, see Oliveira, 1996. 4 
rationality  can  also  be  seen  as  an  example  of  a  historically  situated  self-understanding 
(Habermas, 1989:148). 
Thus, the moral principle of the discourse ethics, the argumentation rule “U” (possible 
impartial justification of justice norms)
10, and the principle of discourse
11, which conditions 
“U” itself, constitute the two most important argumentative-procedural rules that attempt to 
substitute the Kantian categorical imperative.
12 In this new perspective, this rule of reason can 
be described in an intersubjective approach.
13 
In this movement of exteriorizing Kant’s categorical imperative, now “discursivized”, 
Habermas will formulate years later his “principle of law”, which appears in the form of a 
“principle  of  democracy”.  The  main  objective  is  to  set  the  conditions  for  an 
institutionalization  of  a  discursive  formation  of  the  political  opinion  and  will.
14  This 
enterprise  aims  as  well  to  reveal   the  “internal  nexus”  between  individual  and  political 
autonomies, or the intersubjective fundament that guarantees the legitimacy of human rights 
and positive law as forms of coordinating social integration.
15  
This reflection reveals that the principle of democracy, that is, the principle of discourse 
institutionalized by law, assumes the form of guaranteeing, protecting and enhancing the 
                                                           
10 “(U): every valid norm has to fulfill to condition that the consequences and side effects that previously result 
from its universal observance, for the satisfaction of the interests of all individual, can be accepted without 
coercion by the concerned.” (Habermas, 1989:147. Italics from the author. Free translation from Brazilian 
version). 
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13 This interesting reformulation of the categorical imperative in discursive terms is presented by Habermas 
when he transcribes a piece of Thomas McCarthy’s Critique of Mutual Understanding Relations, 1980): “Instead 
of prescribing to all the others as valid a maxim which I want it to be an universal norm, I have to present my 
maxim to all the others for a discursive exam of its validity claim. The weight dislocates from that which each 
(individual) may want without contradiction to an universal law to that which all want in common accord want 
to recognize as an universal law.” (apud, Habermas, 1989:88. Highlights not from the original. Free translation 
from Brazilian version). 
14 “Gem￤ss dem Diskursprinzip dürfen genau die Normen Geltung beanspruchen, die die Zustimmung aller 
potentiell Betroffenen finden könnten, sofern diese überhaupt an rationalen Diskursen teilnehmen. Die gesuchten 
politischen Rechte müssen daher die Teilnahme an allen gesetzgebungsrelevanten Beratungs – und 
Entscheidungsprozessen in der Weise gewährleisten, dass darin die kommunikative Freiheit eines jeden, zu 
kritisierbaren Geltungsansprüchen stellung zu nehmen, gleichmässig zum Zuge kommen kann. Der 
gleichmässigen Verrechtlichung des politischen Gebrauchs kommunikativer Freiheiten entspricht die 
Einrichtung einer politischen Meinungs – und Willensbildung, in der das Diskursprinzip zur Anwendung 
gelangt.” (Habermas, 1992:161. Highlights not from the original). 
15 For a discussion on the social aspect of Habermas’ theory of law, see Habermas, 1997-I:44-47. For a strong 
critique on the Habermasian dual concept of society, which in a sense can be seen as an influence on the 
acceptance of Habermas to conceive bargains as decision making processes that could have a communicative 
character (Habermas, 1996:182; Id., 1996a:199), cf. Honneth, 2007:72; Id. 1991:278-303. See, as well, Blotta, 
2010). 5 
communicative  structures  capable  of  allowing  an  ever  more  egalitarian  formation  of  the 
political opinion and will of the citizens. But if the privileged arena for the formation of the 
political opinion and will of the citizens is the political public sphere
16, it is over the social 
space created by the latter, and not in the legal procedures themselves, that one should orie nt 
the justification practices of an effectively discursive law.  
Through this new perspective, considering that human rights are themes of the practical 
discourse
17, assimilating them intersubjectively does not mean simply to purify them of their 
concrete ethical contents and conceive them as procedural rules of communicative action. As 
noted before, many human rights values and norms emerge from the ethical and existential 
self-understanding  of  determined  societies,  groups,  communities  or individuals,  making  it 
very difficult  to  reach universal  consensuses over their validity. Not to mention  over the 
adequacy of their application in concrete cases.
18 
This means that in the communicative -critical paradigm, the possible “objectivity” or 
universality of certain ethical judgments that reached the status of human rights is situated 
itself in the possibility of discussing ever more openly and freely the validity and adequacy of 
these  rights.  The  cognitivity  of  these  discussions,  or  their  universalizability  (in  terms  of 
practical reason), is thus not present in the cultural values that inform human rights, but is 
roughly stabilized in the normative structures that guarantee to every affected citizen the equal 
possibility of criticizing them. 
In this sense, it is possible to say that human rights can only be conceived more precisely 
- and be more correctly justified - if, on one hand, they stop being thought of only as rights 
that guarantee the freedom of individual life plans or a community’s shared values
19, and on 
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Stellungnahmen, also von Meinungen beschreiben; dabei werden die Kommukationsflüsse so gefiltert und 
sythetisiert, dass sie sich zu themenspezifisch gebündelten öffentlichen Meinungen verdichten. (...) Die 
Öffentlichkeit zeichnet sich vielmehr durch eine Kommunikationsstruktur aus, die sich auf einen dritten Aspekt 
verständigungsorientieren Handelns bezieht: weder auf die Funktionen noch auf die Inhalte der alltäglichen 
Kommunikation, sondern auf den im kommunikativen Handeln erzeugten sozialen Raum.“ (Habermas, 
1992:436. Italics from the author). 
17 The idea of “practical problems” is here meant in the sense practical rationality as thought by Habermas, 
which, with influence of Kantian philosophy, defines it as that which deals with questions related to values and 
human need; to ethics and moral, or to the idea of “good life”; problems which claim questions as “what to do?” 
and “what is good for all?”. In Technik und Wissenschaft als “Ideologie” (1968), for example, Habermas 
presents the thesis that the efficacy of the technocratic ideology would reside in its capacity to eliminate from the 
public debate the practical questions, attributing them only to specialists, what would lead to a depoliticized mass 
culture. See Habermas, 2006, pp. 70-74. 
18 This distinction between the univeralizability of the abstract validity and the adequacy of human rights norms 
in concrete cases follows the theory of the justification and application discourses in law and in morals, 
developed by Klaus Günther, and whose theoretical justification is explicitly used by Habermas in his theory of 
law. See Günther. Der Sinn für Angemessenheit (1988) and Habermas, 1996:238-286.  
19 “An accord between parts that have constituted their identities in traditions and different forms of life is 
always difficult, for there are existentially incompatible vital orientations, even so if this accord has place in an 
international level, among different cultures and, in the interior of a same State, among different subcultural life 6 
the other as objects of study of law researchers and statutes of law professionals, becoming 
otherwise discursive expressions of the political public sphere.
20 
Thus,  the  inevitability  of  the  ethical  question  “what  is  good  for  all  in  a  concrete 
community”,  and the moral  question  “what is  equally  best  for all the  possibly affected”, 
becomes  to  the  public  sphere  a  demand  for  deepening  its  political  functions,  that  is,  the 
processes  of  publicization  and  discursive  legitimation  of  the  social  and  political  order 
(Habermas, 1996; 1996c; 2009a). 
And if the political public sphere assumes this fundamental theoretical and practical role 
in the discursive theory of law and democracy, the states’ powers and organs receive as well 
the task of engendering institutionalization efforts of legal and political issues, especially in 
cases related to human rights.  
In other words, if the political public sphere needs law to guarantee the conditions for its 
democratic discursivization and politicization, the law itself needs the political public sphere 
to  publicize  its  contents  and  problems  as  a  way  of  satisfying  the  legitimacy  claim  of  a 
democratic and constitutional rule of law
21.   
With this theoretical approach, the idea of public hearings in supreme and constitutional 
courts may be understood as proceduralization of popular sovereignty policies, satisfying the 
publicization  of  human  rights  demands  that  become  clear  when  one  suggests  this 
intersubjective approach to the theme. 
In this  sense, the participation  of specialists  and affected citizens  in  public hearings, 
posing arguments for the validity of the norms and the construction the factual substratum that 
leads  to  the  supreme  court’s  decisions,  is  a  way  to  theoretically  satisfy  the  demand  for 
justification discourses to concern every affected interest, and for application discourses to 
collect  the  most  complete  possible  information  on  the  cases  in  order  to  make  their 
adjudicatory  adequacy  judgments,  as  one  can  depict  from  Klaus  Günther’s  Der  Sinn  für 
Angemessenheit (Günther, 2004:368).  
What distinguishes the application from the justification discourse is a matter of factual 
limitation  of  time  and  resources  that  the  first  one  possesses,  and  therefore,  a  normative 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
forms and distinct collectivities. And however it is even more useful the idea that an accord over norms that have 
an obligatory character (for rights and mutual obligations) do not depend on the reciprocal resulting value 
appreciations towards the distinct cultures and life styles, but only in the supposition that each person has the 
same value as a person.” (Habermas, 2002:320. Italic from the author. Highlight not from the original. Free 
translation from Spanish version). 
20 “Von eigenen Traditionen Abstand zu gewinnen und eingeschr￤nke Perspektiven zu erweitern gehört n￤mlich 
zu den Vorzügen des okzidentalen Rationalismus. Die europäische Geschicte der Interpretation und 
Verwirklichung von Menschenrechten ist die Deschichte einer solchen Dezentrierung unserer Sichtweise.“ 
(Habermas, 2009a:299. Italic from the author). 
21 For a further study on this intersubjective approach to human rights, see. Blotta, 2010a. 7 
standard for the collection of the most complete factual information for the decision must also 
be sought. But this limitation does not relieve the judge from considering in the justification 
of his decision the presupposition of the rational acceptability of every affected interest, that 
is, the opinions of the directly or indirectly affected by the adjudication (Günther, op. cit:82-
100).  
Aside from that, the significant resonance and public debates that public hearings can 
foster by their publicization through media vehicles can also help supreme courts to regain 
the supposed “legitimacy deficits” of their “last instance” judicial reviews, as presented in 
works of Habermas and Frank Michelman (Habermas, 2009a:154-175). 
In this case, however, the normative expectations of public hearings seem to propose a 
detachment of this publicization responsibility from the personal attitudes of a singular judge 
who is sensible to both individual and political autonomies, as is Michelman’s example of 
Judge Brennan (Habermas, 2009a:158-162), settling it on the evaluation of procedures of 
these hearings in comparison with their factual conductions. 
Thus, it is through the proposal of an intersubjective interpretation of human rights and 
these more specific normative criteria that the procedures and cases of public hearings held at 
the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) will now be analyzed. 
 
II. Public hearings in Brazil 
First, as the intersubjective approach to human rights suggests a claim for a proceduralization 
of popular sovereignty not only in the adjudicatory discourses, but in any legal discourse 
dealing with  human rights,  a few words  are needed on public hearings in  general  in  the 
Brazilian legal system.  
Public  hearings  are  instruments  utilized  by  the  executive,  legislative  and  judiciary 
branches of the Brazilian political system. Even though they refer to a procedure guided by 
principles of publicity and sharing of expertise (participation of specialists on the debates and 
the search of solutions), there is no uniformity or even a standard form through which they are 
conducted. Even when there is legal reference to the need for, or the possibility of public 
hearing convocations, it is normally given a great deal of liberty to the organ that calls for it, 
in terms of establishing its procedures. This discretionary power, however, is no obstacle for 
the  identification  of  resemblances  in  public  hearings  conducted  by  the  executive  and  the 
Brazilian Supreme Court. 8 
Even though it is not allowed for both organs to “exceed” the theme or question in the 
case, the public hearings are opportunities of deepening the debates of a complex matter
22, 
amplifying,  enriching  and qualifying the discussion with  the  hearing of  experts
23. As has 
stated  STF  Minister  Gilmar  Mendes,  the  public  hearing  is  an  exceptional  event,  and  is 
justified because of the themes to be discussed, for they provoke a great interest in society and 
are of high complexity, demanding the opinion of the interested parts involved, individuals 
and  experts.  Mendes  highlights  that  the  public  hearing  is  (maybe)  the  most  expressive 
opportunity for a plural participation of these various sectors of society in these complex 
processes.
24 
In the executive b ranch, some legislations establish public hearings as a constitutive 
phase of administrative procedures. This legal prevision refers to the  complexity of the theme 
and its repercussion in the public sphere. In this way, the public hearing can confer social and 
technical legitimacy to the procedure, aside of characterizing itself as a participative space for 
multidisciplinary  debates.  In  the  Brazilian  legal  system,  the  strongest  example  is  the 
administrative procedure for environmental licensing. Its legal prevision states that the public 
hearing  is  an  integrating  (obligatory)  part  of  the  environmental  licensing  (for  large 
enterprises), and it must occur after the presentation of the Studies on Environmental Impact 
and before the concession of the first environmental license (Previous License). 
Aside from the hearings in environmental licensing, the Federal Law 9.784/99, which 
regulates  the  administrative  procedure  in  the  sphere  of  the  federal  public  administration, 
establishes in its art. 32 that before reaching a decision, facing a relevant question, the federal 
public administration organ has the faculty of promoting a public hearing in order to discuss 
over the matter of the case. In the same sense, Federal Law n. 9.427/96, which regulates the 
procedures of the Regulatory Agency of the Electrical Sector in Brazil (ANEEL), establishes, 
in its 4
th art., § 3
o, that the public hearing will be necessary when the decision process implies 
the affection of the rights of the economic agents of the electrical sector and its consumers. 
The  Regulatory  Agency  in  the  sector  of  Telecommunications  (ANATEL)  also  promotes 
                                                           
22 Art. 3°, single paragraf., IV of the Regimental Emendment of the STF, 29/09. 
23 As identified in news on the last round of public hearings in the sector of Telecommunications: “The 
discussions of the public hearing try to follow a ritual of technical approach, weaving through a framework of 
decrees, resolutions, abbreviations, concepts and even algebraic equations. The political side runs on the need of 
change of enhancement of the regulatory marc which does not correspond anymore to the impact of the changes 
that a technology, in fast evolution, imposes on the real world.” 
(http://www.telebrasil.org.br/artigos/outros_artigos.asp?m=873, access in June, 06, 2010. Free translation from 
original in Portuguese).  
24STF, typed notes of the public hearing on Affirmative Actions, Opening speech the hearing, given by its 
president and the responsible for the report. Avaliable at: 
(http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/processoAudienciaPublicaAcaoAfirmativa/anexo/Notas_Taquigraficas_Audi
encia_Publica.pdf, access on June 07, 2010). 9 
public hearings to receive contributions of society to themes that are publicized in Public 
Consults
25. 
These similar general legal criteria for the convocation of public hearings in both the 
executive and judiciary branches reveal that they work not only with special concerns for the 
adjudicatory function of law, but are also concerned with an interplay between the affected 
public  sphere  and  the  opinion  of  experts.  In  this  sense,  one  can  say  that  this  satisfies 
normatively  Habermas’  presuppositions  for  the  proceduralization  of  popular  sovereignty 
efforts discussed previously, as well as his concerns with the problems of scientificization and 
professionalization of politics, and its relations with the public opinion that emerges from the 
lifeworld.
26 
 
1. Public hearings in the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) 
The  Brazilian  Constitution  establishes  in  its  5
th  art.,  LV,  what  it  calls  the  right  to  the 
contraction principle (right to interplay of reason giving justifications in legal contends), and 
inc. LX of the same article the duty of the publicization of the acts by the judiciary branch. 
Still in the constitution, art. 93, IX indicates that, as a general rule, all judgments of the 
judiciary are public.  
However, the large number of hearings (not reserved) that occur in the judicial cases, 
including the STF
27, in the instruction phase (collecting of evidence and arguments), must not 
be confused with the instrument for popular participation called  public hearing, for the latter 
has specific characteristics and is marked by the exceptionality of its convocation, which only 
occurs when the minister responsible for the first vote (reporter), or the president minister 
understands as necessary the “clarification of questions or circumstances of fact, with general 
repercussion and of relevant public interest, debated in the sphere of the Court.”   
The public hearing (strictu sensu) is a recent institute in the STF, which originated, along 
with  the  institute  of  the  amici  curiae,  from  the  group  of  procedural  innovations  in  the 
constitutional  jurisdiction,  with  the  goal  of  enabling  a  more  effective  participation  of 
organized civil society in the Court. With the enactment of Law n. 9.868/99, public hearings 
can be utilized by the Brazilian constitutional court in the direct unconstitutionality instrument 
(ADIn) and the declaration of constitutionality instrument (ADC).  
                                                           
25 See Federal Law n 9.472/97. 
26 See Habermas, “Scientificization of Politics and Public Opinion” (Free trans. from Portuguese version). In. Id, 
2006: 107-128. 
27 Art. 154, inc. II, of Intern Regiment of the STF 10 
Law 9.868/99 establishes that it is the report minister’s the faculty the “fixation of date 
for, in public hearing, hearing statements from people with experience and authority on the 
matter”. The convocation of a public hearing presupposes some complexity and the need of 
finding  technical  elements  (from  people  with  expertise),  given  that  the  decision  of  the 
convocation  must  be  taken  in  case  of  “necessity  of  clarification  of  the  matter  of  factual 
circumstance or of notorious insufficiency of the information present in the documents of the 
case”
28. In the same sense is the prevision of Law 9.882/99, which indicates the possibility of 
the reporter minister in a process “questioning of violation of fundamental precept” (ADPF) 
to “fixate date for the declarations, in public hearing, of people with experience and authority 
on the matter”, in case finds necessary.
29 
Having as basis art. 9º of Law 9.868/99, the first convocation for a public hearing in the 
STF was made in December 19
th, 2006, by the reporter minister of the case that had as central 
question the validity of researches with stem-cells
30. The minister decided for the hearing by 
understanding that “aside from subsidizing the ministers of the Court”, the hearing would be a 
form o enabling a larger participation of civil society and, in consequence, “legitimizing even 
more the decision to be taken by the Plenary of the Court”. In total 34 specialists were invited 
to participate in the audience as expositors, presenting theses and topics contrary or in favor 
of the utilization of embryos stocked in human fertilization clinics.
31   
In 2009, the Regimental Amendment 29/09 added to the court’s Internal Regiment norms 
that also allow the president of the Court to “convoke public hearing in order to listen to the 
statements  of people with  experience and  authority in  a determined matter, always when 
understanding the need for the clarification of questions of circumstances of fact, with general 
repercussion and of relevant public interest, which are debated in the Court” and to “decide, in 
unquestionable  form,  over  the  manifestation  of  third  parties,  subscribed  by  habilitated 
attorney, in public hearings (…)”
32. The same norm still establishes that the reporter minister 
has the attribution of convoking public hearings and deciding over the manifestation of the 
thirds.
33  
Despite this clear expansion of the attributions of the president or reporter minister, 
which  goes  against  the  previously  discussed  idea  that  the  publicization  effort  of  the 
adjudicatory discourses in supreme courts  should  not  depend  on  the  personal  protagonist 
                                                           
28 Art. 9°, §1° and art. 20, §1° Law 9.868/99. 
29 Art. 6°, §1° of Law 9.882/99 
30 ADIn 3.510, rel. Minister Carlos Ayres de Britto. The case was judged improcedent, by 6 votes to 5. 
31 This public hearing was promoted on April 20th, 2007, but its reports are not available in the STF website, in 
the virtual space destined to the theme. 
32 Art. 13, XVII and XVIII STF Internal Regiment STF actualized by Regimental Amendment  STF 29/09. 
33 Art. 21, XVII and XVIII STF Internal Regiment STF actualized by Regimental Amendment  STF 29/09. 11 
attitude of a singular judge - especially in an unquestionable and sovereign decision -, the 
Regimental  Amendment  sought  to  bring  more  objective  parameters  for  the  STF  public 
hearings, with the definition of a minimum procedure to be observed.  
Thus, public hearings in the STF must be widely disseminated, being responsibility of 
the presiding minister to fix a date for the indication of the persons to be heard. After that, the 
president  minister  must  select  the  persons,  publishing  the  list  of  habilitated  participants, 
determining the order of the works, fixating a time for manifestations. It is expected to be 
granted the participation of diverse positions over the matter object of the hearing, especially 
when there are defenders and oppositionists. There is also an obligation for the speaker to 
limit his or her exposition to the theme or the question in debate. 
Moreover, in the procedures of the hearings there is the duty of registering and inserting 
the  documents  of  the  works  in  the  audiences  inside  the  case’s  files,  or  when  in  another 
circumstance, in the files of the presidency, as well as transmitting the public hearing through 
“TV Justiça” and by the “Radio Justiça”, two Brazilian state media.
34  
The establishment of parameters for the public hearings in the STF aims to guarantee the 
objectivity of this participative instrument, but the definition of its directives is maintained as 
attribution of the minister who presides the public hearing. Therefore, it is faculty of the 
minister who decides for the realization and invokes it, to indicate as well the themes to be 
debated,  the  case  or  cases  related  to  the  theme,  the  expositors  who  will  be  heard,  the 
organizational form of the oral statements, the other possibilities of society’s contribution by 
receiving written documents, the control of the hearing session, among other aspects.
35 
The form of these procedures could be questioned on whether it does not concentrate too 
much discretionary power to the president and t he reporter minister, or again, if these other 
presuppositions would be sufficiently procedural to counterweight the subjective judgment 
and the protagonist attitude of a single judge.  Especially on what concerns the choice of 
themes and the decision over who is going to be expositor, it seems that this norm could be 
more objective, following constitutional principles such as fundamental rights, and being 
more permeable to public participation, in terms of allowing the interested parts to chose the 
themes of their own argumentation. 
Until June 2010, six public hearings have been promoted in the STF: a) on the validity of 
researches with stem-cells; on the demarcation of indigenous lands (Raposa Serra do Sol 
case); c) on abortion and the possibility of interr uption of the gestation of anencephalic 
                                                           
34As states the Internal Regiment of the STF, art. 154, single par., I – VII, with content given by the Regimental 
Amendment STF29/09. On the theme, sse. Pinto and Rosilho, 2009. 
35 Pinto and Rosilho, op.cit, 2010. 12 
fetuses (ADPF 54); d) on the possibility of importation of used tires (ADPF 101); e) on the 
right to health; and f) on affirmative actions (or reverse discrimination) for higher education 
access (March, 2010). One should highlight that in the Raposa Serra do Sol case, the public 
hearing only occurred because after the end of the instruction process (when, theoretically, the 
case was ready to by judged), other parts requested entrance in the process, as “interested 
thirds”.
36  
The acceptance of these “thirds” in the action generated a necessity to include “other 
voices” to the decision of the controversy. For that, despite having already judged the theme 
of the demarcation of indigenous land in other cases, in the Raposa Serra do Sol case there is 
the differential of the public debate brought by the theme. It is, however, still depending on 
the sensibility of the reporter minister to call for the intervention of thirds after the finalization 
of the instruction process.
37 
By the simple reading of the themes that have been now object of public hearings in the 
STF, aside from the clear characteristics of all of them being cases involving human rights 
issues, one cannot yet establish the objective parameters over the  matters  that  have  the 
potential of provoking a public debate with the participation of organized civil society in the 
realm of the constitutional court. Meanwhile, in the case concerning the demarcation of lands 
belonging  to  quilombos
38,  even  though  having  received  m ore  than  20  requests  for  the 
promotion of a public hearing (by civil society as well as public organs as the Federal 
Prosecution’s Office, the General Attorney’s Office of the states of Pará and Paraná, among 
others),  until  the  end  of  this  paper,  the  position  of  the  reporter  minister  was  that  of  not 
convoking a public hearing. 
However,  the  great  number  of  public  and  private  entities  who  have  habilitated 
themselves as amici curiae and requested the public hearing is a strong indication that the 
theme is important and complex, and that it needs hence a wide debate in the sphere of the 
constitutional court.  
The case above exemplifies  well the importance of using the institute of the  amicus 
curiae, especially when there are no defined parameters on which matters should be object of 
public  hearings.  In  the  opinion  of  the  STF,  the  ingression  as  amicus  curiae  is  justified 
                                                           
36 The reporter minister raised it as matter of order in the Plenary for understanding that the situation was very 
complex and demanded a collective decision. 
37 As the statute of Roraima, FUNAI, the Brazilian Federal agency which deals with matters of indigenous 
people and the land owners. 
38  ADI 3239. The affects directly approximately three thousand communities formed by people that are 
reminiscent from quilombos (communities of freed and/or fugitive slaves of the colonial period) in Brazil. The 
petition contests the decreet 4.887/03, that regulates the constitutional rule over the ocupation of quilombola 
lands (art. 68 of the Final Constitutional Rules Act - ADCT). 13 
“especially in face of the relevance of the case, or yet, in face of the notorious contribution 
that the manifestation may bring for the judgment of the case”.
39  
Thus, if the convocation of the public hearing depends on subjective criteria (from the 
reporter minister or the president minister), organized civil society in the constitutional arena 
should consider the strategic importance of habilitating itself as amicus curiae, in order to 
have the chance to effectively interfere on the debate.
40  
In this sense, it is interesting to highlight that even though the reporter minister may have 
understood that the public hearing was not needed, the entrance of several entities as  amici 
curiae was accepted with the following statement: “Considering the relevance of the question 
and with the objective of pluralizing the constitutional debate, I apply analogically the precept 
present in the § 2º of art. 7º of Law n. 9.868/99, admitting the entrance of the petitioner in the 
quality of amicus curiae, observing in the oral statement what is presupposed in the art. 131, § 
3º,  of  the  Internal  Regiment  of  the  STF  (RISTF),  in  the  form  given  by  the  Regimental 
Amendment n. 15, of March, 30, 2004." 
Aside from the cited cases, the perception of the relevance of the habilitation as amicus 
curiae in the processes of constitutional jurisdiction can be exemplified in the case which will 
judge  the  legal  possibility  of  union  of  persons  of  the  same  sex
41.  In  this  petition  for 
questioning the violation of fundamental precept (ADPF), there are innumerous requests for 
the inclusion in the process from entiti es with diverse profiles (from purely academic to a 
religious party, and so forth).  
In this case, the reporter minister has admitted, with basis on the relevance of the matter 
and the representation of the petitioner many entities as  amici curiae, even relativizing the 
deadline for the formulation of the request  of  entrance as  amici  curiae.  In this  case, the 
reporter minister has  evoked the jurisprudence already settled in  the STF, citing minister 
Gilmar Mendes: “especially due to the relevance of a case or, yet, in face of the notorious 
contribution that the manifestation may bring to the judgment of the cause, it is possible to 
cogitate the hypothesis if admission of amicus curiae, even when out of the deadline set for it 
[formulation of request] (ADI 3.614, Rel. Min. Gilmar Mendes)”
42.   
                                                           
39 ADI 3.614 e ADPF 97, both reported by Min. Gilmar Mendes 
40 On the institute of the amicus curiae and public audiences, in the perspective of this instrument in the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights being seen as an international public sphere, see Cardoso, 2007 <Not 
Available>. 2010-06-04 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p181673_index.html (last acces: June 24th, 2010) 
41 ADPF 132, reporter. Minister Carlos Ayres de Britto, case still not judged. It is important to highlight that 
many entities have been enrolled as amici curiae. 
42 ADPF 132, reporter. Minister Carlos Ayres de Britto, decision concerning petition nº 47.634, abstract 
available at http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoAndamento.asp (last access: June 16, 2010). 14 
Therefore, the possibility of bringing to the STF the highest number of different positions 
in complex cases depends on the minister who, in the course of the instruction process, has 
the power to allow or not the entrance of entities that may potentially contribute to the debate 
and convoke public hearings. The more pluralistic and accessible is the participation of civil 
society in the constitutional jurisdiction - especially through oral statements (and presentation 
of documents) of the entities that enter as amici curiae – the highest will be the quality of the 
contributions over technical points (expertise), as well as the repercussion of diverse points of 
view in  the public sphere, democratizing the discussion and decisions  over human rights 
cases. 
In this way, the absence of a pattern and the subjective instance that judges the possibility 
or  not  of  the  convocation  of  a  public  hearing  can  be  somewhat  counterweighted  when 
combined with the amicus curiae instrument, with the objective of balancing the gap between 
experts and the affected parties, enhancing the legitimacy of the adjudication. The collected 
material of the public hearings and the amici curiae statements can contribute as well to 
define the way that their demands should be considered in the future by the Judiciary, as was 
in the case on the right to health
43, noted in the STF website in September of 2009.
44  
 
2. Procedures of public hearings at the STF 
a) On the convocation 
The STF minister Ricardo Lewandowski, on the opening of the series of public hearings on 
the  affirmative  action  case  (access  to  university  for  African-Americans),  pointed  two 
interesting  aspects  of  public  hearings  that  conceptualize  them  well:  1.  That  the  Federal 
Constitution of 1988 has taken an extraordinary qualitative step in order to overcome a merely 
representative  democracy  proposing  new  participative  democracy  spaces  for  relations 
between power and the public: “that is, a participation of the people, of the citizenry, in the 
decision  making  processes”.  Moreover  that  “public  hearings,  the  amicus  curiae  institute, 
which are the “friends of the Court”, who collaborate in the adjudication of the questions 
presented to the STF, aside from the broadcast of the court sessions over television channels, 
                                                           
43  Hearing convoked by minister Gilmar Mendes, when was minister president of the STF. 
44  President of the STF decides case over the distribution of medicines with basis on the public hearing of 
health: “Having as basis the information collected in the public hearing on heath, promoted at the STF, the 
president of the Court, minister Gilmar Mendes, understood that the medicines requested for the treatment of 
health must by distributed by the State. This is the first time that the STF utilizes information by the hearing to 
fix orientations over the matter. The data were used in the analysis of the Suspensions of Anticipated Protections 
decisions (STAs). (…) After hearing the statements presented in the public hearing (…) the minister Gilmar 
Mendes understood as necessary to redimension the question of the judicialization of the right to health in Brazil. 
For that, has highlighted the fundamental points to be observed in the judicial treatment of health cases, in the 
attempt of constructing criteria or parameters of decision” (free translation from Portuguese version) Avaliable at 
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/listarNoticiaUltima.asp, last Access: September, 19
th, 2009.   15 
are part of the approximation process between citizenship and the powers of the republic, 
especially of the Judiciary Process”; and 2. That  “the public hearings  really  represent  an 
opportunity that the STF has of listening not only to civil society in general, but also to the 
members of other state powers and specialists on the matters”.
45 
However, as already cited, in the case of the demarcation of reminiscent Quilombo’s 
land, even though more than 20 requests for a public hearing were presented by several state 
and society actors, they were not enough to convince the sovereign decision of the reporter 
minister. 
The same occurred in the case that judged the validity of the amnesty law for those who 
practiced crimes as torture, murder and forced disappearance and others in the dictatorship 
period (ADPF 153). The reporter minister used chronological criteria to determine the non-
relevance  of  the  matter  public  hearing,  as  well  as  the  sufficiency  of  documents  and 
information on the case for the decision.
46 
 However, the matter of the ADPF 153 comprised all the expected pre-requisites for the 
convocation of a public hearing: general repercussion, relevant public interest and controversy 
over federal law that preceded the Constitution. However, the decision did not only use 
subjective criteria on what concerned the relevance of the theme, but also on what refers to 
the sufficiency of the information available for the decision, even though the globally known 
jurisprudence on the matter was not considered. One can say that the denial of a public 
hearing and the judgment on the case has followed, in a sense, the orientation of the Brazilian 
state on how it has until now dealt with the human rights violations perpetrated during the 
military regime (1964-85): maintaining the sensation of impunity and denying the recognition 
of the truth and memory of the period.  
With this analysis, it is possible to say that this decision has not only a legitimacy deficit 
on its capacity of considering all the possibly affected by the case, but also that the criteria of 
                                                           
45STF, Notes of the Public Hearing on Affirmative Actions. Opening speech of the President of the hearing. In. 
http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/processoAudienciaPublicaAcaoAfirmativa/anexo/Notas_Taquigraficas_Audie
ncia_Publica.pdf (last Access: June, 7th, 2010). 
46 The understanding of the reporter minister was that there was no need for a public audience, as stated in 
overruling of the request, on April of 2010. “2. Says that the relevance of the matter that are treated in this 
process would demand the debate and the hearing of ‘internationally renowned specialists’. The petition was 
proposed in October of 2008. Only now this circumstance in alleged. 3. The arguments present in the documents 
of the case by the petitioner do not demonstrate sufficiently the need for the promotion of the public hearing now 
requested, which would only delay the exam of the matter. Nothing else. 4. The process is instructed sufficiently, 
allowing a perfect understanding of the matter debated in this case of fundamental precept questioning. The 
request made a long time after the first petition of the case would result in useless delay of its judgment. 
Overrule it.” Minister Eros Grau. Report of the Judgment Session of the ADPF 153 (Free translation from 
Portuguese original). Available at: 
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoAndamento.asp?incidente=2644116, last Access: June, 7th, 
2010).   16 
the collection of all possible information on the characteristic signs of the situation could also 
be perfectly questioned, as the international law jurisprudence on transitional justice has been 
denied consideration in the process.  
 
b) On the definition of the expositors 
On what concerns the definition and the limitation of the expositors, the ADPF 54, which 
dealt with the theme of abortion and the possibility of pregnancy interruption in the case of 
anencephalic fetuses, exemplifies well the excessive powers of the reporter minister. Still in 
2004, the minister suggested the public hearing and stated the necessity of hearing the entities 
that had entered as amicus curiae and also others with expertise on the theme. However, in 
the same decision, the court denied the participation of eight professors on the field suggested 
by the Federal Prosecutions Office, stating that this office had not specified the areas of each 
professor and that the other accepted entities had already enabled diverse views on the theme. 
Aside from revealing the extreme power of the reporter minister, the denial of public 
hearing in ADPF 153 case shows as well how fragile the possibility of the participation of 
civil society really is, as it continues to depend on the will of a single judge in order to occur.  
On what concerns the lack of new collaborations to the problem, the documents produced 
from  civil  society’s  participation  in  the  public  hearing  on  health
47  constitute  a  large  and 
extremely interesting material
48 for law researchers and judges of oth er courts, especially 
because it reaches beyond the treatment of legal questions, with a holistic approach to the 
theme.
49 
This is why the material collected in public hearings has a potential of transcending the 
limits of the judgments. And for that reason  the ministers have to use creativity, so that the 
procedure can have diversity of qualified contributions without missing the focus or allowing 
the prevalence of one point of view over others presented. The model that combines written 
and oral collaboration seems to be the one that enables the best results. This is why the health 
                                                           
47  Hearing convoked by minister Gilmar Mendes, at the time President of the STF. 
48 In this sense, approximately a hundred of articles and documents were inserted in the case’s files. The 
complete list of the material brought by civil society can be found in: 
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=processoAudienciaPublicaSaude. Access in June, 6
th, 
2010. 
49 In the public hearing 50 specialists were heard, among lawyers, public defenders, prosecutors and chief 
prosecutors, judges, professors, doctors, health technicians, users and administrator of the Brazilian public health 
system. Hearings promoted on the 27
th, 28
th and 29
th of April and on the 4
th, 6
th and 7
th of May, 2009. More 
information at: http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=processoAudienciaPublicaSaude. Access 
in June, 6th, 2010. 17 
public hearing superseded the necessary elements of STF decisions on the theme
50, showing 
that the search for balance in plural positions cannot be a limit to the right to public 
participation. 
The opposite of this case was the ADPF 153, which needed the contribution of specialists 
and authorities on the matter, who could speak of previous international experiences of 
transitional justice, question themes such as how these violation s were treated in other 
countries and perpetrated at the same time in Latin America, and how they are treated by the 
Inter-American Court on Human Rights on themes of self -amnesty, right to truth and the 
duties of the states in relation to forced disappearance, torture and others.  
The interdisciplinary study of the question already clarifies that the best way to deal with 
human rights cases is by a  pluralization of the contributions that emerge from the public 
sphere in the form of petitions. In ADPF 153, however, the STF did not observe its duty to 
publicize the political power in the moment that it denied the promotion of a public hearing on 
the case, undermining the legitimacy claim of the final decision. 
The new initiative of the government in order to overcome this legitimacy deficit on the 
question is the legal project that creates the National Truth Commission, an extra-judiciary 
instrument  that  contributes  to  a  public  and  democratic  construction  of  the  truth  process, 
consequence of the implementation of the rights claimed in transitional justice processes, such 
as truth and memory. The works of the commission do not intend to have an adjudicatory but 
only a declaratory power.
51   
ADPF 153 is thus, a counter example that shows how much the absence of publicization 
efforts on human rights cases, especially in the STF, responsible for the protection and 
interpretation of the constitution, can involve its decisions in legitimacy deficits. It shows as 
well the great procedural problem highlighted in the conditions for the convocation of a 
public hearing: the sovereign and discretionary faculties of the president or the reporter 
minister of the case.  
It could even be the case to think of new possible objective criteria in the court’s internal 
regiment to limit this discretionary power: when an evident and justified matter concerning 
human rights (or the fundamental rights of the constitution. Art. 5
th, CF) is raised in a case in 
                                                           
50 In the Court are processed Regimental questionings, suspension of preliminary judgments, suspensions of 
anticipated legal protection and security suspensions, all of them processes of the report sector of STF’s 
presidency. 
51 The Law Project 7376/2010 is result of a special work-group convoked by the Brazilian President to elaborate 
the previsions and procedures of a extra-judicial truth commission on the violation of human rights in the 
dictatorial period. The representative of civil society to lead the commission was Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, 
coordinator of the Center for the Study of Violence, and the specialists present in his research group on the 
theme at the NEV, as Glenda Mezzaroba, were some of the collaborators to the project. More information on the 
project and its processing by the congress, visit: http://www.camara.gov.br/sileg/Prop_Detalhe.asp?id=478193  18 
the  STF,  the  convocation  of  a  public  hearing  would  be  mandatory,  as  a  consequent 
proceduralization  of  popular  sovereignty  policy.  This  legal  demand  would  definitely 
withdraw  from  the  protagonist  attitude  of  the  main  minister  of  the  case  the  faculty  of 
convoking or not public hearings, and settle it on justified procedural rules of the court that 
represent defense of the constitution. But if the decisions over the public hearing requests still 
depend on the singular judges’ decision, this problem is still not overcome.   
One  can  conclude  from  this  study,  therefore,  that  the  proceduralization  of  popular 
sovereignty  claim  that  becomes  visible  when  an  intersubjective  interpretation  of  law  is 
undertaken, can serve not only as new normative standard that pressures for the amplification 
and  the  pluralization  in  the  adjudicatory  discourses,  but  also  as  criteria  that  can  be  used 
operatively  to  evaluate  the  legitimacy  level  of  concrete  legal  decisions,  especially  in  the 
discussion of their procedures and their use in concrete judgments on human rights cases.  
In the end, it becomes possible to say that maybe as never before the legitimacy of the 
constitution in democratic rules of law depended as much on the capacity of civil society to 
accept or to problematize the order from “the outside”, as on the claim that law itself should 
enable, and to filter through its own acts, a discursive formation of the political opinion and 
will that emerges from the political public sphere. 
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